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Abstract
This paper presents a strategic model of liability and litigation under court errors. Our frame-
work allows for endogenous choice of level of care and endogenous likelihood of filing and dis-
putes. We derive sufficient conditions for a unique universally-divine mixed-strategy perfect
Bayesian equilibrium under low court errors. In this equilibrium, some defendants choose to
be grossly negligent; some cases are filed; and, some lawsuits are dropped, some are resolved
out-of-court and some go to trial. We find that court errors in the size of the award, as well as
damage caps and split-awards, reduce the likelihood of trial but increase filing and reduce the
deterrence effect of punitive damages. We derive conditions under which the adoption of the
English rule for allocating legal costs reduces filing.
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1 Introduction
Punitive damage awards have been widely criticized for being capricious and “unpredictable”. It
is hard to predict which actions the jury will find sufficient to justify a punitive award, whether
the legal standard is framed in terms of gross negligence, wanton or reckless misconduct or flagrant
indifference to the safety of others.1 Firms are then unable to take specific measures to avoid
liability, and therefore, the deterrence effect of punitive damages2 cannot be realized (Economic
Report of the President, 2004).3 There is also a common perception that excessive punitive damage
awards4 generate a plaintiff’s windfall (i.e., an amount in excess of the costs of pursuing the puni-
tive claim), which promotes unnecessary litigation (Dodson, 2000) and the escalation of liability
insurance premiums.5 In an attempt to overcome some of these negative effects, several US states
have implemented different kinds of tort reform (Sloane, 1993). Some reforms take the form of caps
or limits on punitive damage awards6 while others, called ”split-awards”, have mandated that a
share of the award be allocated to the plaintiff with the remainder going to the state.7 In addition,
1The exact words used to describe the standard for punitive damages vary by jurisdiction. In this paper, we use
”gross negligence” to represent the punitive damage standard.
2Punitive damages are primarily intended to punish defendants for their egregious conduct against society and to
deter others from engaging in similar conduct in the future (Sloane, 1993).
3Besides undermining deterrence, “unpredictability” of punitive damages may also affect the incentives to file a
lawsuit and to litigate.
4Justice O’Connor stated that punitive damage awards had “skyrocketed” more than 30 times in the previous ten
years, with an increase in the highest award from $250,000 to $10,000,000 (Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282, 1989).
5Note that liability coverage is widely spread in the United States. In 1990, the total tort liability payments
were approximately $65 billion (more than 1% of the U.S. GDP), of which 93.5% were made by liability insurers (O’
Connell, 1994).
6Damage caps have been widely implemented in the U.S. Approximately 30 states currently employ some form of
liability limits (Babcock and Pogarsky, 1999).
There exist as many different cap schemes as states that employ them. Ranging from Georgia’s straightforward
cap, which limits punitive damages to $250, 000, to elaborate attempts to tailor punitive damages to the assets of
the defendant and the degree that the defendant benefited from its tortuous conduct. Some states employ a flat
dollar cap, a multiplier of compensatory damages, or some combination of both. Some caps pertain to all civil cases,
while others apply to certain classes of actions, such as medical malpractice or product liability. “[T]he variety of
statutory damage limitations share a common feature–they circumscribe a previously unbounded array of potential
trial outcomes” (Babcock and Pogarsky, 1999; p. 345). In this paper, we employ a straightforward cap, one that
limits plaintiff’s recovery to a specific dollar amount. i.e., reduces the maximum plaintiff’s recovery.
7Split-awards have been implemented in Alaska, California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon,
and Utah. New Jersey and Texas have contemplated, but not yet adopted, split-award statutes (White, 2002).
Statutes vary with the state: the base for computation of the state’s share can be the gross punitive award or the
award net of attorney’s fees; the state’s share can be 50%, 60% or 75%; the destination of the state’s funds can be
the Treasury, the Department of Human Services or indigent victims funds. For details, see Dodson (2000), Epstein
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the adoption of the English rule for allocating legal costs (fee-shifting)8 has been proposed.9 Pro-
ponents of split-awards state that, contrary to damage caps that reduce both the incentives to file
a lawsuit and deterrence, split-awards reduce the incentives to file a lawsuit but maintain adequate
levels of deterrence and punishment (Sloane, 1993).
This paper attempts to capture the main effects of tort reform of “unpredictable” punitive
damages and to assess the effects of “unpredictability” of punitive awards on deterrence and lit-
igation. We present an original game-theoretic framework, which allows for endogenous decision
on care, filing and disputes under asymmetric information, heterogeneous types of plaintiffs, and
“unpredictable” punitive damages. “Unpredictable” punitive damages are modeled by assuming
that ambiguously defined guidelines or jury instructions generate random mistakes from the court
in the size of the award.10 As a result, “unpredictable” punitive damages are observed.11 We then
apply this framework to study the effects of court errors, damage caps and split-awards. Finally,
we extend our benchmark model to study the effects of fee-shifting.
Our model consists of three stages. In the first stage, the potential injurer decides whether
to be grossly negligent. This decision depends on the cost of preventing accidents and on the
expected litigation loss in case of an accident. The level of care determines the probability that
an accident occurs. If an accident occurs, the second stage, called the filing stage, starts. Nature
decides the opportunity cost of time for the potential plaintiff from a continuum of types.12 The
(1994), Stevens (1994), Sloane (1993).
8Under the American rule each party pays her own litigation costs at trial. In contrast, under the English rule
the loser at trial pays the litigation costs of the winner.
9Florida temporarily adopted (for the period 1980–1985) a mandatory fee-shifting rule in medical malpractice
cases (see Hughes and Snyder, 1995; Snyder and Hughes, 1990).
10Alternatively, court errors can be interpreted as errors in the assessment of liability (Polinsky, 1997). Our
framework is suitable for both interpretations.
11“In most states, there is an statute describing the conditions under which punitive damages may be awarded
... These statutes merely provide guidelines for awarding punitive damages. Because the guidelines have not been
formulated into exact rules, there is much uncertainty about when punitive damages can be awarded.” (Cooter
and Ulen, 2004, p. 372). In addition, empirical studies show that cognitive limitations preclude juries to correctly
mapping their judgments onto dollar values (Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, 1998).
12This cost, independent of the defendant’s level of care, captures the effect of personal characteristics of plaintiffs
that influence the decision to file a lawsuit. Empirical research on filing has found, that besides the severity and
financial losses caused by the injury, demographic and economic characteristics of injured people (age, sex, education,
income), which are exogenous to the damage level (and therefore to the level of care that defendants exert), influence
the decision of injured people to file a lawsuit. Sabry and Dunbar (2004) find, for instance, that potential plaintiff’s
income and probability of filing are negatively related.
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potential plaintiff then decides whether to file a lawsuit.13 If a lawsuit is filed, the third stage,
called the pre-trial bargaining stage, starts. It consists of a signaling-ultimatum game, where two
Bayesian risk-neutral parties, an uninformed plaintiff and an informed defendant,14 negotiate prior
to a costly trial. We derive sufficient conditions for a unique universally-divine (Banks and Sobel,
1987) mixed-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium under low court errors. In this equilibrium, some
defendants choose to be grossly negligent; some cases are filed; and, some lawsuits are dropped,
some are resolved out-of-court and some go to trial. We find that court errors in assessing the size
of the award, as well as damage caps and split-awards, reduce the likelihood of trial but increase
filing and reduce the deterrence effect of punitive damages. Finally, we derive conditions under
which the adoption of the English rule for allocating legal costs reduces filing.
Several policy implications follow from the analysis. First, the model points to the significance
of the strategic behavior of plaintiff and defendant for the analysis of the effects of tort reform on
deterrence. In particular, the analysis indicates that damage caps and split-awards may reduce
the expected loss for a grossly negligent defendant. Therefore both polices can reduce deterrence.
Second, the analysis underlines the importance of the defendant’s care decision for the study of
the effects of tort reform on filing. The analysis indicates, somewhat counter-intuitively, that
damage caps and split-awards may increase the number of lawsuits. The reason is this: the reform
measures limit the plaintiff’s recovery in each individual case but also reduce overall deterrence
(i.e., a higher fraction of defendants choose to be grossly negligent). As such, the filing plaintiff
has a greater chance of confronting a grossly negligent defendant. This “pool” effect outweighs the
plaintiff’s lower expected recovery from suit. And, as a result, the tort reform measures generate
more lawsuits.15
Attorney search costs provide another reason why the cost of filing suit might differ across plaintiffs. Some tort
victims know attorneys; others do not. If a victim knows an attorney, he might feel more comfortable pursuing a
cause of action with that attorney or asking that attorney for a referral. Like other plaintiff-specific characteristics,
these search costs are independent of the merits of the case.
13Note that the plaintiff’s decision to file a lawsuit is influenced by two factors: the opportunity cost of time for
the plaintiff, KF ; and, the plaintiff’s expected litigation payoff, which depends on the defendant’s level of care.
14The defendant possesses information about its level of care and the decision of the court should the case go to
trial.
15Indeed, this result may reflect “fishing” expeditions by plaintiffs, which are sometimes observed in practice.
Given that there are more grossly negligent defendants under damage caps and split-awards, more plaintiffs might
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To the best of our knowledge, Hylton (1993) and Hylton (2002) are the only two papers that
analyze liability and litigation using game-theoretic models which allow for endogenous decision on
care, filing and disputes under asymmetric information and court errors. Hylton (1993) studies the
effects of the English rule under certain model parameterization and finds that the likelihood of
trials and deterrence (when legal costs are high) are higher under the English rule. Hylton (2002)
examines settlement rates, plaintiff win rates and compliance with the due-care standard. He also
assesses the effects of the English rule under certain model parameterization and finds that this rule
is superior to the American rule in terms of social welfare. The effects of court errors on settlement
are ambiguous. The effects of court errors on deterrence and filing, and the effects of damage caps
and split-awards are not analyzed.
Png (1987) and Landeo and Nikitin (2005) study tort reform by constructing game-theoretic
models, which allow for endogenous decision on care and disputes under asymmetric information.
Filing and court errors are not studied. Png (1987) analyzes the effects of damage caps and the
adoption of the English rule, and finds that damage caps reduce the expenditures on safety, and
fee-shifting lowers the level of care for careful defendants, increases the level of care for negligent
defendants, and increases the frequency of trial. The effect of damage caps on disputes is ambiguous
and the effect of damage caps on filing is not studied. Landeo and Nikitin (2005) extend previous
work on split-awards (Kahan and Tuckman, 1995; Daughety and Reinganum, 2003)16 by including
file lawsuits just to see what happens (i.e., whether the defendant caves and makes a positive settlement offer). This
result may suggest that states adopting these reforms should, simultaneously, consider strengthening the sanctions for
frivolous lawsuits. In addition, this result suggests that plaintiffs’ attorneys in states with lower overall deterrence need
not do as much investigation of the plaintiff’s claim before filing suit. Note also that the same general insight follows
in differing regulatory environments. Jurisdictions with looser regulation and, hence, less deterrence of business
misconduct, should actually see more lawsuits. This result holds because plaintiffs in these jurisdictions have an
incentive to file a lawsuit because they have an increased chance of confronting grossly negligent defendants. Finally,
it bears significant mention that this result is similar in spirit to the one derived in Bernardo, Talley and Welch
(2000). They show that pro-defendant rules, specifically legal presumptions, can in equilibrium lead to more lawsuits.
However, their model doesn’t include settlement at the litigation stage. Our framework includes settlement and, as
such, can be seen as an extension of their work.
16Kahan and Tuckman (1995) construct a simultaneous-move game between a plaintiff and a defendant and find, in
the absence of agency problems, that split-awards reduce the plaintiff’s litigation expenses and, consequently, reduce
the expected amount paid by the defendant. Daughety and Reinganum (2003) incorporate asymmetry of information
and strategic behavior to the study of split-awards by modeling the pre-trial bargaining as a game of incomplete
information. They find that holding filing constant, split awards simultaneously lower settlement amounts and the
likelihood of trial.
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the analysis of deterrence. Their model predicts, under certain conditions that, holding filing
constant, a decrease in the plaintiff’s share of the award decreases the conditional probability of
trial. In addition, they find that split-awards reduce the expenditures on safety.
Snyder and Hughes (1990) and Hughes and Snyder (1995) empirically study the effects of the
adoption of the English rule in Florida and find that the English rule increases plaintiff success
rates at trial and the average jury awards. These findings suggest that the English rule lowers the
filing of low-merit cases. Babcock and Pogarsky (1999) analyze the effect on settlement rates of a
damage cap set lower than the value of the underlying claim, using a bargaining experiment. They
find that damage caps constrain the parties’ judgments and produce more settlement. Landeo,
Nikitin, and Babcock (2005) experimentally study split-awards and find that this reform reduces
the likelihood of trial.
The paper is organized as follows. Section Two presents the setup of the benchmark model and
describes the equilibrium solution. Section Three analyzes the effects of court errors, split-awards,
and damage caps under this benchmark model. Section Four describes the effects of fee-shifting.
Section Five contains concluding remarks and outlines possible directions for further research.
2 The Benchmark Model
We model the interaction between a potential injurer17 and a potential plaintiff, as a sequential
game of asymmetric information under court errors. In this benchmark model, we assume that the
allocation of the legal costs follows the American rule, i.e., each party pays its own legal costs.
We focus our analysis on an equilibrium in which, some defendants choose to be grossly liable;
some weak cases are filed; and, some lawsuits are dropped, some are resolved out-of-court and some
go to trial. This equilibrium resembles the actual state of affairs of lawsuit termination.18
17We will use the terms injurer and defendant interchangeably.
18Data from the U.S. Department of Justice indicate, for a sample of the largest 75 counties (one-year period ending
in 1992), that 76.5% of product liability cases were disposed through agreed settlement and voluntary dismissal and
3.3% were disposed by trial verdict. The other 20.2% were disposed as follows: 4.5% by summary judgment, 0.5% by
default judgment, 6% were dismissed, 2.7% by arbitration award, 6.1% by transfer, and 0.3% by other dispositions
(Smith et al., 1995).
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2.1 Model Setup
The potential injurer first decides its optimal level of care e, i.e., the one that minimizes its total
expected loss L, where e ε{e0, e1}. The injurer is grossly negligent if the level of care chosen is e0;
otherwise, the injurer is simply negligent and therefore not liable for punitive damages.19 High level
of care e1 costs the injurer c, while low level of care e0 costs nothing. The probability of accidents
is λ(e), where λ1 = λ(e1) < λ(e0) = λ0.
We define the defendant’s total expected loss function as L = c(e)+λ(e)l, where l is the expected
loss from legal action. We take this loss as parametric in order to describe L, but ultimately l will
be derived as the continuation value of the litigation stage, and hence it will differ for grossly
negligent and not liable defendants. The endogenous probability that a defendant is negligent is
represented by p. The choice of level of care is privately known by the defendant. The potential
plaintiff knows that the defendant can choose between these two possible levels, and that only the
low level of care implies gross negligence.
If an accident occurs, the filing stage starts. Nature first decides the opportunity cost of time for
the potential plaintiff, KF . This cost is exogenous and randomly selected from a continuum of types
and distributed on [0, K̄F ].20 We define φ(.) and F (.) as the probability density and cumulative
density functions of the distribution of plaintiffs by opportunity cost of time, respectively. φ(.)
and F (.), as well as the realization of KF , are common knowledge. Then, the potential plaintiff
decides whether to file a lawsuit. The filing decision is based on the potential plaintiff’s costs
KF and her beliefs about the level of negligence of the defendant conditional on the occurrence
of an accident. With probability q she believes that the defendant is grossly negligent, and with
19In real-world settings, punitive damages are awarded only in cases where the defendant is found grossly negligent
(i.e., where the defendant’s actions were malicious, oppressive, gross, willful and wanton, or fraudulent). This implies
that a due care standard for gross negligence is applied.
20KF is independent of the defendant’s level of care. It captures the effect of personal characteristics of potential
plaintiffs that influence the decision to file a lawsuit. Empirical research on filing has found, that besides the severity
and financial losses caused by the injury, demographic and economic characteristics of injured people (age, sex,
education, income), which are exogenous to the damage level (and therefore to the level of care that defendants
exert), influence the decision of injured people to file a lawsuit. Sabry and Dunbar (2004) find, for instance, that
potential plaintiff’s income and probability of filing are negatively related.
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probability (1 − q) she believes that the defendant is negligent.21 A potential plaintiff will file a
lawsuit if its expected payoff from suing (i.e., expected litigation payoff minus KF ) is positive. The
endogenous probability that a lawsuit is filed is represented by m.
If a lawsuit is filed, a pre-trial bargaining negotiation starts. It is modeled as a signaling-
ultimatum game between two Bayesian risk-neutral players, a potential injurer and a potential
plaintiff.22 The defendant has the first move and makes a settlement proposal. After observing
the proposal, the plaintiff, who knows only the two possible choices of care that the defendant
can choose, decides whether to drop the case, to accept the defendant’s proposal (out-of-court
settlement) or to reject the proposal (bring the case to the trial stage). The plaintiff’s decision is
based on her updated beliefs about the type of defendant she is confronting after observing the
defendant’s proposal. If the plaintiff drops the case, both players incur no legal costs. If the plaintiff
accepts the defendant’s proposal, the game ends and the defendant pays the amount proposed to
the plaintiff.
If the plaintiff rejects the proposal, plaintiff and defendant incur exogenous legal costs (KP and
KD, respectively) and the court decides whether to award punitive damages A to the plaintiff.
“Unpredictable” punitive damages are modeled by assuming that ambiguously defined guidelines
for determining the size of punitive damage awards generate random mistakes from the court in
the size of the award. We assume that the distribution of the potential awards is binomial with two
possible values, 0 and A, and that the court awards A with probability 1−τ1 and 0 with probability
τ1 if the defendant is grossly negligent. If the defendant is negligent, the court then awards A with
probability τ2 and 0 with probability 1 − τ2. We also assume that τ1 + τ2 < 1. This implies that
(1 − τ1)A > τ2A, i.e., the mean award is higher for the grossly negligent defendant. Therefore,
the expected award depends on the defendant’s conduct. Under the split-award regime, and in the
event that punitive damages A are awarded, the plaintiff receives only a fraction f of the award
21The values for q and (1− q) are taken as parametric during the pre-trial bargaining subgame, but they ultimately
depend on the optimal decision of filing by the plaintiff and on the optimal levels of care chosen by the injurer in
the first stage of the game, according to the cost of care and his expected litigation costs (that correspond to the
equilibrium in the pre-trial litigation stage).
22We model the pre-trial bargaining stage by following Png (1987) and Landeo and Nikitin (2005).
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A and the state gets a share (1− f) of the award. We employ here a straightforward definition of
cap, one that limits the plaintiff’s recovery to a specific dollar amount, and therefore, reduces the
maximum plaintiff’s recovery A.23
The sequence of events in the game is shown in Figure 1.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
Note that, A is determined by the jury and the information about the split-award statute is
supposed to be kept from the jury, A does not depend on f . Then, we will treat A and f as
exogenous parameters of the model. Note also that, without loss of generality, for the sake of
mathematical tractability and given that our primary goal is to explore the effect of tort reform
on punitive damages (i.e., damage caps and split-award statute), we abstract from compensatory
damages.24 In addition, given that punitive damages are awarded only in cases where the defendant
is found grossly negligent (i.e., where the defendant’s actions were malicious, oppressive, gross, or
willful and wanton), we consider only two choices of care: exert a level of care e = 1, i.e., meet the
standard for gross negligence; and, exert a level of care e = 0, i.e., not to meet the standard and
therefore, be liable for punitive damages.25
23Given that we consider only one positive award A, we are implicitly assuming that all plaintiffs have the same
damage type. However, court’s errors in assessing the size of the award, generates different expected awards for
plaintiffs with the same level of damage.
24Punitive damage claims are derivative and must be related to a regular tort claim.
Our model can be modified to incorporate compensatory damages, without altering the qualitative predictions pre-
sented here, in the following way. Assume that the court awards compensatory damages CDA (common-knowledge)
whenever the accident happens (i.e., strict liability applies), but it awards punitive damages A only if the firm fails
to achieve the due care standard for gross negligence. Assume also bifurcation of trial, i.e. two separate trials decide
on compensatory and punitive damage awards; that the compensatory damages game has the same structure as
the punitive damages game presented here; and that legal costs, KPCDA and KDCDA are paid by the plaintiff and
defendant, respectively, only in case of trial. Then, in case of an accident, the plaintiff and the defendant do not have
asymmetric information with regard to prospective compensatory damage awards, and therefore, they settle out of
court. Thus, every defendant will offer CDA − KPCDA, and every plaintiff will accept.
Thus, the total loss function is given by L = c(e) + λ(e)(CDA − KPCDA + l), where l is the expected loss from
legal action related to punitive damages. It is easy to show that all qualitative results presented in Sections 4 and 5
will hold.
25Note that our qualitative results hold in a framework that allows for three choices of care: careful, negligent
and grossly negligent. Assume that the costs of care are strictly increasing in the amount of care and that punitive
damages are awarded only in case of gross negligence. Then, if the cost of being careful is sufficiently high, the
strategy “careful” is strictly dominated by the strategy “negligent”. So, the rational defendant will randomize only
between negligence and gross negligence. The influence of the choice of care on the litigation stage will be then
through q̂ and (1− q̂), where q̂ represents the probability that an accident is caused by a grossly negligent defendant.
Hence, all our qualitative results will hold.
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2.2 Equilibrium under Low Court Errors
We focus our analysis on the equilibrium under low court errors, i.e., τ1 and τ2 are below some
threshold, and τ1+ τ2 < 1. This characteristic of court errors conforms to the empirical findings.26
In this equilibrium, some defendants will choose to be grossly negligent, while others will choose
to be negligent; and only some cases are filed. In addition, some negligent defendants reveal their
gross negligence through offers to settle, which are accepted by plaintiffs. Other gross negligent
defendants try to hide their type by mimicking the behavior of negligent defendants and make no
offer. There is a sufficient number of those grossly negligent and “dishonest” defendants for the
information provided to the plaintiff by the action chosen by the defendant (refusal to settle) to be
not transparent. Therefore, some plaintiffs respond to a refusal to settle by bringing their case to
trial, while others drop their action.
This equilibrium constitutes the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game that survives
Banks and Sobel’s (1987) universal divinity refinement27 under the following conditions:
(1− τ1)fA−KP > τ2A+KD, (1)



















] . τ̄1 and τ̄2(τ1) correspond to the values for τ1 and τ2
for which m = 1 (see Proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A).
Condition (1) rules out the pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium where negligent defendants
behave as grossly negligent defendants in the pre-trial bargaining stage. It also guarantees that
at least some potential plaintiffs file a lawsuit (i.e., it ensures m > 0).28 Conditions (2) and (3)
guarantee that some but not all defendants choose to be grossly negligent (i.e., they ensure q < 1
and q > 0, respectively). Additionally, conditions (2) and (3) ensure that not all potential plaintiffs
26Tullock (1980) estimates the probability of legal error generally to be about 0.13.
27See Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Schweizer (1989), and Landeo and Nikitin (2005) for previous applications of
the universal divinity refinement to litigation games.
28In addition, it ensures that τ1 + τ2 < 1.
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file a lawsuit (i.e., they ensure m < 1). Then, conditions (2) and (3) rule out the pooling perfect
Bayesian equilibrium where the deterrence effect of punitive awards totally vanishes. In this pooling
equilibrium, no defendant chooses to be negligent, all injured plaintiffs file a lawsuit and all cases
are settled out-of-court.29
Under conditions (1)–(3), however, the pre-trial bargaining subgame has other partially sep-
arating equilibria30 and other pooling equilibria, but they do not survive the universal divinity
refinement (see Appendix A for details).
Proposition 1 characterizes the unique universally divine equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 1. Assume that conditions (1)–(3) hold. Then, the following strategy profile, together
with the players’ beliefs, represents the equilibrium path of the unique universally divine Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of the game.
Strategy Profile





] . In response
to an offer S1 = 0, the plaintiff rejects the offer (goes to trial) with probability α =
(1−τ1)fA−KP
(1−τ1)A+KD
and accepts the offer (drops the action) with probability (1 − α); the plaintiff always accepts the
offer S2 = (1− τ1)fA−KP (settles out-of-court).
















. The grossly negligent defendant makes no offer
(offers S1 = 0) with probability β =
(KP−τ2fA)(1−q)
q[(1−τ1)fA−KP ] and offers S2 = (1−τ1)fA−KP with probability
(1− β). The negligent defendant always makes no offer (offers S1 = 0).
Plaintiff’s Beliefs
The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiff believes with probability
29Intuitively, at high levels of court error (i.e., when τ1 ≥ τ̄1 or τ2 ≥ τ̄2), the incentives for filing are maximized,
and the highest level of filing is achieved, i.e., m = 1. At those levels of error, filing is insensitive to the liability of
defendants, and therefore, there are not incentives to invest in care.
30These other partially separating equilibria do not allow for cases to be dropped, and therefore, they do not
conform to the empirical regularities on termination of lawsuits.
10
(1− q) that she is confronting a negligent defendant, and with probability q that she is confronting
a grossly negligent defendant. When the plaintiff receives an offer, she updates her beliefs using
Bayes’ rule: when she receives an offer S1 = 0, she believes with probability
(1−q)
qβ+(1−q) that she is
confronting a negligent defendant and with probability qβqβ+(1−q) that she is confronting a grossly
negligent defendant; when the plaintiff receives an offer S2 = fA−KP , she believes with certainty
that she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant. The off-equilibrium beliefs are as follows.
When the plaintiff receives an offer S
′
such that 0 < S
′
< (1− τ1)fA−KP or when she receives an
offer S
′
> (1− τ1)fA−KP , she believes that this offer was made by a grossly negligent defendant.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Although the model is solved formally in Appendix A, here we outline the main steps of the
solution. The model is solved backwards. We start by finding the solution of the pre-trial bargaining
subgame.31 Then, we evaluate the plaintiff’s filing decision and assess the defendant’s choice of
care.
Consider the expected payoffs for the plaintiff, no-grossly-negligent and grossly negligent defen-
dants, in terms of α and β. The expected payoff for the plaintiff is VP = (1−q)[α(τ2fA−KP )+(1−
α)(0)]+q{β[α[(1−τ1)fA−KP ]+(1−α)(0)]+(1−β)[(1−τ1)fA−KP ]}; the expected payoff for the
negligent defendant is VD1 = α(−τ2A−KD) + (1− α)(0); and, the expected payoff for the grossly
negligent defendant is VD0 = β[α(−((1− τ1)A+KD))+ (1−α)(0)] + (1−β)[−((1− τ1)fA−KP )].
The values of α and β are calculated from the condition that both parties (the plaintiff and the
grossly negligent defendant) have to be indifferent between their strategies to mix them. So,




qβ + (1− q) [(1 − τ1)fA−KP ] +
1− q
qβ + (1− q)(τ2fA−KP ). (5)
31The values for q and (1− q) are taken as parametric during the pre-trial bargaining subgame, but they ultimately
depend on the optimal filing decision by the plaintiff and on optimal levels of care chosen by the injurer in the first
stage of the game, according to the cost of care and his expected litigation costs (that correspond to the equilibrium
in the pre-trial litigation stage).
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Equation (4) says that a grossly negligent defendant is indifferent between admitting his gross
negligence (i.e., offering S2 = (1−τ1)fA−KP ) and stating that he is negligent (i.e., offering S1 = 0)
with the risk to lose (1− τ1)A+KD if the case goes to court. Equation (5) says that a plaintiff is
indifferent between dropping the case and getting a payoff of S1 = 0 and going to court. Solving
(4) for α and (5) for β, we get
α =
(1− τ1)fA−KP
(1− τ1)A+KD , (6)
and
β =
(KP − τ2fA)(1− q)
q[(1− τ1)fA−KP ] . (7)
The expected litigation payoffs for the plaintiff, negligent and grossly negligent defendant are





(τ2A+KD) and VD0 = −[(1−τ1)fA−
KP ], respectively.
The conditional probability of trial is
α[1 − q(1− β)] = fA(1− q)(1− τ1 − τ2)
(1− τ1)A+KD . (8)
The conditional probability of out-of-court settlement is
q(1− β) = q
{




And, the conditional probability of dropping a case is











Using the previous results on plaintiff’s expected payoff from litigation, we analyze now the
plaintiff’s decision about filing.
A plaintiff will file a lawsuit if her expected payoff from suing (i.e., expected litigation payoff
net of KF ) is positive,32 that is if
[q(1− τ1) + (1− q)τ2]fA−KP −KF > 0. (11)
32Note that the plaintiff’s decision to file a lawsuit is influenced by two factors: the opportunity cost of time for
the plaintiff, KF ; and, the plaintiff’s expected litigation payoff, which depends on the defendant’s level of care.
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Then, the probability of filing is
F (q(1− τ1)fA+ (1− q)τ2fA−KP ) ≡ m. (12)
Now, we will proceed to analyze the defendant’s choice of care. The defendant decides the level
of care y taking into account Li = c(yi) +mλili (i = 0, 1), where li is the expected loss from legal
action, different for no-grossly-negligent and grossly negligent defendants.

c+mλ1l1 if e1
0 +mλ0l0 if e0
(13)
where c is the cost of care (i.e., cost of choosing to be negligent); m is the probability that a lawsuit
is filed; λi is the probability of an accident; l0 = [(1 − τ1)fA−KP ] is the expected litigation loss




(τ2A+KD) is the expected litigation loss for
a negligent defendant.
We construct an equilibrium in which some defendants choose to be negligent and others choose
to be grossly negligent. This is the equilibrium behavior that conforms to the asymmetry of the
pre-trial bargaining subgame and to the real-world behavior of potential injurers.







(τ2A+KD) = mλ0[(1 − τ1)fA−KP ]. (14)
This condition can be rewritten as
c = m[(1− τ1)fA−KP ]
[




where the left-hand side of equation (15) represents the defendant’s cost of accident prevention and
the right-hand side represents the defendant’s benefit from accident prevention, i.e., difference in
the unconditional expected litigation costs for grossly negligent and negligent defendants.
From equation (14), the indifference condition for randomization between e1 and e0, we find m,
the probability of filing that supports the randomization of choice of care.
m =
c
[(1 − τ1)fA−KP )]
[
λ0 − λ1 (τ2A+KD)(1−τ1)A+KD
] . (16)
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It is important to note, that m > 0 because λ0 > λ1 (by assumption) and because condition (2)
ensures that τ2A+KD(1−τ1)A+KD < 1. In addition, conditions (3) and (4) guarantee that m < 1 (see Proof
of Proposition 1 in Appendix A).
Now we can obtain q, the probability that an accident is caused by a grossly negligent defendant.
From equation (12),
q(1− τ1)fA+ (1− q)τ2fA−KP = F−1(m). (17)
Then,
q =
F−1(m) +KP − τ2fA
fA(1− τ1 − τ2) . (18)
The expression for q is always positive, because KP > τ2fA by condition (3). In addition, condition
(2) implies that q < 1 (see Proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A).
Finally, we get the expression for p, the probability that a defendant chooses to be negligent.
By Bayes’ rule, q = λ
0(1−p)
λ0(1−p)+λ1p . Solving for p, we get
p =
λ0(1− q)


















Given the previous results, the probability of accident is µ = λ1p + λ0(1 − p), where p is
given by equation (20). Now, we can derive the unconditional probability trial. The probability
of trial conditional on occurrence of the accident and filing is fA(1−q)(1−τ1−τ2)(1−τ1)A+KD , then the uncondi-
tional probability of trial is fA(1−q)(1−τ1−τ2)(1−τ1)A+KD mµ. Given that (1− q) =
λ1p
λ0(1−p)+λ1p is the probability
that a defendant has been negligent conditional on the occurrence of an accident, then, the un-
conditional probability of trial is equal to fAλ
1p(1−τ1−τ2)
(1−τ1)A+KD m, where m is given by equation (16)
and p is given by equation (20). Similarly, given that the probability of out-of-court settlement
conditional on occurrence of the accident and filing is equal to q[1− (KP−τ2fA)(1−q)q[(1−τ1)fA−KP ] ], then the un-
conditional probability of out-of-court settlement is equal to µ− λ1p[fA(1−τ1)−τ2](1−τ1)fA−KP m. Finally, given
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, then the unconditional probability of dropping a









3 Comparative Statics under the Benchmark Model
This section analyzes the effects of court errors, damage caps and split-awards, on the likelihood of
trials (conditional probability of trial) and filing (m), on the deterrence effect of punitive awards
(p), and on the probability of an accident (µ). We assume that the changes in τ1, τ2, A, or f are
small enough to preserve conditions (1)–(3).
3.1 Effects of Court Errors
Punitive awards have been widely criticized for their “unpredictability”. It has been argued that
this “unpredictability” lowers the deterrence effect of punitive damages (see for example, Polinsky
and Shavell, 1989). We show here that randomness in the size of the award, i.e., court errors,
indeed lower deterrence. In addition, court errors increase filing but reduce the likelihood of trials.
Proposition 2. A reduction in the size of the expected award for a plaintiff confronting a grossly
negligent defendant (i.e., an increase in the probability that a grossly negligent defendant will not
be asked to pay any award, τ1) decreases the probability of trial, increases the probability of filing,
decreases the deterrence effect of punitive awards and therefore, increases the probability of an
accident.
Proof. See Appendix A.
33Note that the signaling framework adopted here involves no trial for grossly negligent types who reveal, and
positive probability for grossly negligent types who pool with no-grossly-negligent types. On the other hand, a
separating equilibrium in a screening framework (with the same information structure) would involve a plaintiff’s
demand which is accepted by grossly negligent defendants and rejected by negligent defendants. Hence, there are
some qualitative differences in the equilibria of the signaling and screening models. However the comparative statics
results are qualitatively similar across models, with the exception that, given that m does not depend on f in the
screening model, there is no impact of split-awards on the probability of filing under that framework. Hence, the
effects of split-awards on filing can be analyzed only under a signaling framework. This is reason for which we decided
to adopt this framework.
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An increase in τ1 reduces the plaintiff’s expected payoff from suing (expected litigation payoff
net of filing cost) by lowering the expected recovery at trial. But, an increase in τ1 also increases
the plaintiff’s expected payoff from suing by reducing deterrence and therefore, increasing the
probability that an accident is caused by a grossly negligent defendant q. This effect operates as
follows. An increase in τ1 reduces the expected litigation losses for a grossly negligent defendant,
and therefore, reduces the difference in expected litigation losses for negligent and grossly negligent
defendants (i.e., potential injurer’s benefit from taking care). Then, deterrence is reduced (and
probability of accidents is increased), and therefore, the probability that an accident is caused by a
grossly negligent defendant, q, increases. We show that the increase in the plaintiff expected payoff
from suing (due to an increase in q) offsets the reduction due to a lower expected recovery at trial.
Hence, the probability of filing increases.34
In addition, given that an increase in τ1 reduces the likelihood that a grossly negligent defendant
will pay A, plaintiffs are less willing to go to court and therefore, plaintiffs accept more frequently
out-of-court offers, i.e., the probability of rejection of a zero-offer by the plaintiff, α, goes down.35
Hence, the probability of trial decreases.
Proposition 3. An increase in the size of the expected award for a plaintiff confronting a negligent
defendant (i.e., an increase in the probability that a negligent defendant will be asked to pay A,
τ2) increases the probability of filing.
Proof. See Appendix A.
An increase in τ2, i.e., an increase in the likelihood that a negligent defendant will be asked to
pay A, increases the plaintiff’s expected payoff from suing. Thus, the incentives to file a lawsuit
34Note that the increase in filing increases the incentives to take care. However, the effect of τ1 on the difference in
expected litigation losses for negligent and grossly negligent defendants offsets this second effect. As a consequence,
an increase in τ1 reduces deterrence.
35Note also that an increase in τ1 reduces the expected loss at trial for a grossly negligent defendant (1−τ1)A+KD,
and therefore, reduces the willingness of grossly negligent defendants to make positive out-of-court offers (i.e., increases
the likelihood that a zero offer comes from a grossly negligent defendant). This will decrease the plaintiff’s willingness
to accept zero offers (i.e., increases α). However, we show that this latter effect is offset by the first effect of τ1
(reduction in α).
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are higher and the probability of filing increases.36
3.2 Effects of Damage Caps and Split-Awards
We assess the effects of the adoption of damage caps and split-awards. Given that damage caps
reduce the maximum plaintiff’s recovery at trial A, the adoption of damage caps is represented by
a reduction in A. The introduction of split-awards is represented by a reduction in f , the plaintiff’s
share of the punitive award.
Proponents of split-awards argue that, in contrast to caps that reduce both the plaintiff’s
windfall and the deterrence effect of the punitive awards, the split-award statute constitutes a
“move toward effectuating the true purpose of punitive damages” (Sloane, 1993, p. 473).37 They
claim that split-awards reduce the plaintiff’s windfall but maintain adequate levels of deterrence
and punishment.38 These claims are based on the observation that both, split-awards and damage
caps reduce the plaintiff’s recovery at trial, but contrary to damage caps, split-awards do not reduce
the loss for the grossly negligent defendant at trial. We show here, that the decision on care depends
not only on the loss for the defendant at trial but also on the out-of-court settlement outcomes
(which are affected by both reforms). Given that the incentives to take care are lower under both
reforms, both split-awards and damage caps reduce the deterrence effect of punitive damages. We
also show that, if we consider the impact of these reforms not only on the plaintiff’s recovery at
trial but also on deterrence, then we can conclude that both, split-awards and caps increase the
likelihood of filing.
In addition, we find that the adoption of split-awards and damage caps reduce the likelihood of
trials. Experimental studies conducted by Babcock and Pogarsky (1999), and Landeo, Nikitin, and
Babcock (2005), on damage caps and split-awards, respectively, support our theoretical results.
36The effects of τ2 on the deterrence effect of punitive awards, and on the probabilities of an accident and disputes
are ambiguous.
37The main purposes behind the award of punitive damages are to punish defendants for their egregious conduct
against society and to deter others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. In addition, punitive damages
serve to encourage plaintiffs to bring forth minor criminal offenses that are not likely to be prosecuted yet nonetheless
are offensive to society, and compensate plaintiffs for their attorneys’ fees (Sloane, 1993).
38In addition, split-awards allow the plaintiffs to receive a share of the awards for payment of attorney fees and
rewards for their civil duty as “private attorney generals” (Case Note, 1993; Dodson, 2000; Evans, 1998; Epstein,
1994; Stevens, 1994; Sloane, 1993).
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Proposition 4. The introduction of damage caps or split-awards decrease the probability of trial,
increases the probability of filing, decreases the deterrence effect of punitive awards and therefore,
increases the probability of an accident.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A decrease in A or f reduces the plaintiff’s expected payoff from suing (i.e., reduces the incen-
tives to file a lawsuit) by lowering the expected recovery at trial. But a reduction in A or f also
increases the plaintiff’s expected payoff from suing by lowering deterrence and therefore, increasing
the likelihood of confronting a negligent defendant, q. This effect operates in the following way. A
decrease in A or f reduces the defendant’s benefit from accident prevention (i.e., difference in the
expected litigation costs for grossly negligent and negligent defendants), and therefore, reduces the
incentives to take care.39 As a consequence, the deterrence effect of punitive damages is reduced
(and the probability of accidents increases). Then, it will be more likely that accidents be caused
by negligent defendants, i.e., q will be higher. Hence, the plaintiff’s expected payoff from suing will
increase. We show that the increase in the plaintiff’s expected payoff from suing (due to an increase
in q) offsets the reduction due to a lower expected recovery at trial. As a result, the probability of
filing increases.40
In addition, given that a decrease in A or f reduces the expected recovery at trial, plaintiffs are
more willing to accept a zero offer. Then, the probability that the plaintiff rejects a zero offer, α,
goes down. As a consequence, the probability of trial decreases.41
39Specifically, a decrease in A or f reduces the defendant’s benefit from accident prevention through its effect on
the probability that a plaintiff rejects a zero offer: a reduction in f or A lowers the plaintiff’s expected recovery at
trial, and therefore, reduces the probability that a plaintiff rejects a zero offer. As a consequence, the expected loss
for a grossly negligent defendant is reduced, the incentives to take care are also reduced, and q increases.
In case of damage caps, however, there is an additional effect to consider. A reduction in A also decreases the
difference in the expected losses at trial for grossly negligent and negligent defendants, and therefore, reduces the
incentives to take care and increases q even more. Hence, damage caps and split-awards increase the probability that
a grossly negligent defendant is involved in an accident, q, but there are some quantitative differences in the effects
of both reforms.
40Note that the increase in filing increases the incentives to take care. However, the effect of A or f on the difference
in expected litigation losses for grossly negligent and negligent defendants offsets this second effect. As a consequence,
a decrease in A or f reduces deterrence.
41Note that in case of damage caps, there is an additional effect to consider. A reduction in A also decreases the
expected loss at trial for a grossly negligent defendant, and therefore, reduces the willingness of negligent defendants
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4 Effects of Fee-Shifting
We now proceed to analyze the effects of adopting the English rule for allocating legal costs by
comparing the results from the benchmark model with the results from a modified version of this
model under the English rule.42
Empirical studies of the effects of the adoption of the English rule in Florida during the period
1980–1985 (Hughes and Snyder, 1995; Snyder and Hughes, 1990) indicate that fee-shifting results
in higher compensations and higher frequency of cases where plaintiffs win. These findings suggest
a reduction of filing of less meritorious cases. Our model indeed captures this effect. Proposition 5
summarizes this result.
Proposition 5. The adoption of the English rule as a method for allocating legal costs decreases
filing if τ1 < KPKP +KD .
Proof. See Appendix A.
The condition τ1 < KPKP +KD implies that τ1 should be relatively small. This condition conforms
to empirical findings (Tullock, 1980). Note also that this is a sufficient, but not necessary condition.
Intuitively, given that under the English rule the plaintiff should pay the legal costs of both
parties in case of losing at trial, the plaintiffs expected payoff from suing is lower under the English
rule. Then, the incentives to file a lawsuit are reduced and hence, the likelihood of filing is lower
under the English rule.
If, in addition, τ2 is sufficiently big, the English rule raises the likelihood of trials but also
increases the deterrence effect of punitive damages and therefore, lowers the probability of an
to make positive out-of-court offers (i.e., increases the likelihood that a zero offer comes from a negligent defendant).
This will decrease the plaintiff’s willingness to accept zero offers (i.e., increases α). We show that this latter effect is
offset by the first effect of A (reduction in α). Hence, damage caps and split-awards reduce the probability of trial.
Note however, that there are some quantitative differences in the effects of both reforms.
42The setup of this modified model is similar to the one presented in Section 2. The only difference is the rule for
allocating legal costs in case of trial: under the English rule, the losing party at trial pays the legal costs of both
parties. The structure of the equilibrium is also similar to the one adopted for the benchmark model. See Appendix
A for details about the equilibrium strategy profile and beliefs of the model under the English rule.
We assume that conditions stated in Proposition 1 and Proposition A1 (equilibrium under the English Rule model,
in Appendix A) hold.
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accident. Proposition 6 summarizes this result.
Proposition 6. The adoption of the English rule as a method for allocating legal costs increases the
probability of trial, increases the deterrence effect of punitive awards and therefore, decreases the




Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that the conditions τ1 < KPKP +KD and τ2 >
KD
KP +KD
are sufficient but not necessary condi-
tions.
The difference in expected litigation losses for grossly negligent and no-grossly-negligent defen-
dants is higher under the English rule. Then, the incentives to take care may be greater and the
deterrence effect may be higher under the English rule, even though the likelihood of filing is lower.
This higher deterrence under the English rule reduces the likelihood of confronting negligent
defendants at trial and therefore, decreases the willingness of plaintiffs to go to trial (i.e., the prob-
ability of rejecting zero offers goes down). This effect decreases the likelihood of trials. However,
the higher deterrence also increases the willingness of defendants to make no offers (i.e., the prob-
ability of making zero offers goes up). This effect increases the likelihood of trials. We show that,
if τ2 is big enough and τ1 is small enough, the second effect offsets the first one, and therefore, the
likelihood of trials is higher under the English rule.43
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a strategic model of liability and litigation under court errors. The framework
allows for endogenous decision about investment in accident prevention, and endogenous likelihood
of filing and disputes. This article is not the first to consider liability and litigation in the same
framework but is the first to apply a framework with endogenous decisions on care, filing and
dispute, under court errors, to the analysis of damage caps and split-awards.
43From the empirical findings (Tullock, 1980), we should infer that court errors are in general low. Then, even
though τ2 does not meet the sufficient condition on Proposition 6, we should expect that the results stated in that
proposition be more likely as τ2 increases.
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We construct an equilibrium under low court errors, where some (but not all) defendants choose
to be grossly negligent; some (but not all) cases are filed; and, some lawsuits are dropped, some are
resolved out-of-court and some go to trial. We then use this benchmark model to analyze the effects
of court errors, damage caps, split-awards and fee-shifting. We find that court errors in assessing
liability of negligent defendants, as well as damage caps and split-awards, reduce the likelihood of
trial but increase filing and reduce the deterrence effect of punitive damages. We find conditions
under which the adoption of the English rule for allocating legal costs reduces filing. Our model
proves to be complete, i.e., it captures the main effects of tort reform of punitive damages, but
tractable enough to be used as a tool for the analytical study of tort reform and court errors.
Our analysis has several policy implications. First, it points to the significance of the strategic
behavior of plaintiff and defendant for the analysis of the effects of tort reform on deterrence. In
particular, the analysis indicates that both damage caps and split-awards may reduce the expected
loss for a grossly negligent defendant and therefore they may reduce deterrence. Second, the
analysis underlines the importance of the defendant’s care decision for the analysis of the effects of
tort reform on filing and indicates that damage caps and split-awards may increase the plaintiff’s
expected payoff from suing by increasing the likelihood of confronting grossly negligent defendants.
Therefore, caps and split-awards may increase filing of lawsuits.
Avenues for further research may involve an extension of this benchmark model by allowing the
awards to depend also on the lawyer’s effort. This model can be then used to evaluate the new
method of lawyer’s payment proposed by Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003). Using an asymmetric
information model of litigation, Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003) show that this payment method
aligns the interests of lawyers and clients, by providing the incentives to the lawyers to do exactly
what a knowledgeable client would want him to do with respect to accepting the case, spending
time on the case, and settling the case. However, their model does not allow for endogenous choice
of level of care or court errors in assessing the liability of the defendant.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proofs of Propositions 1–4, solution of the model of liability and litigation under the English rule,
and proofs of Propositions 5 and 6 follow.
Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof has three main parts. In the first part, we prove the existence of the partially sepa-
rating equilibria of the pre-trial bargaining subgame, under conditions (1)–(3). In the second part,
we show that the partially separating equilibrium of the pre-trial bargaining subgame, proposed
in Proposition 1, is the only partially separating equilibrium of the pre-trial bargaining stage that
survives the universal divinity refinement and therefore, is the unique universal divine PBE of the
pre-trial bargaining stage. In the third part, we complete the proof of the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium of the whole game, proposed in Proposition 1. First, we prove that some but not
all potential plaintiffs file a lawsuit; second, we show that some but not all potential injurers are
grossly negligent; and, third, we prove that the described mixed-strategy equilibrium is the only
equilibrium of the game.
Part 1. Existence of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the Litigation Game
Part 1.1. We eliminate the dominated and iteratively dominated strategies for each player.
Rationality suggests that since the plaintiff can get at most (1 − τ1)fA − KP at trial, the
plaintiff should accept any pretrial offer over (1− τ1)fA−KP . That is, any strategy that calls for
the plaintiff to reject an offer greater than (1− τ1)fA−KP is weakly dominated by a strategy in
which he accepts the offer.44 Rationality also suggests, given that the plaintiff can drop the case
and lose nothing, the plaintiff should reject any pretrial offer S < 0. That is, any strategy that calls
for the plaintiff to accept an offer lower than zero is dominated by a strategy in which he rejects
the offer.
44It is only weakly dominated because the second strategy does not result in a strictly higher payoff against every
one of the defendant’s strategies. In particular, it does not result in a strictly higher payoff if the defendant’s strategy
is to refuse to offer a settlement (i.e., offer S = 0) whether grossly negligent or no-grossly-negligent.
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Because the plaintiff accepts all offers over (1 − τ1)fA − KP (maximum payoff at trial), any
strategy in which the defendant offers more than (1− τ1)fA−KP when she is grossly negligent is
iteratively dominated by a strategy in which she offers exactly (1 − τ1)fA−KP . Rationality also
tells us that the defendant will offer no more than KD (loss for a no-grossly-negligent defendant at
trial) if she is no-grossly-negligent. Finally, because the plaintiff rejects all offers below zero, any
strategy in which the defendant offers less than zero is iteratively dominated by a strategy in which
she offers exactly zero. Then, the minimum possible offer is S = 0 and represents the defendant’s
refusal to settle.
Hence, after eliminating the dominated strategies and a first round of elimination of the it-
eratively dominated strategies for each player, we can restrict our attention to the offer space
[0, (1−τ1)fA−KP ] for the grossly negligent defendant (i.e., a proposal cannot be negative or greater
than the maximum payoff the plaintiff can get in court); and, to the offer space [0, τ2A+KD], for the
no-grossly-negligent defendant (i.e., a proposal cannot be negative or greater than the maximum
loss the no-grossly-negligent defendant can get in court).
Let’s apply iterative elimination of dominated strategies again. Because the no-grossly-negligent
defendant never offers more than τ2A + KD and since the plaintiff can get (1 − τ1)fA − KP at
trial, rationality suggests that the plaintiff should reject any pretrial offer over τ2A + KD and
lower than (1 − τ1)fA − KP . That is, any strategy that calls for the plaintiff to accept such an
offer is iteratively dominated by a strategy in which he rejects the offer. Rationality also tells us
that the grossly negligent defendant will not make any offer greater than τ2A + KD and lower
than (1 − τ1)fA − KP . Then, the offer space for a grossly negligent defendant gets reduced to
[0, τ2A+KD] U {(1− τ1)fA−KP }.
Part 1.2. We prove that in equilibrium the grossly negligent defendant randomizes at most
between two possible strategies. In Part 1.1. we show that the offer space for the grossly negligent
defendant is given by [0, τ2A+KD] U {(1− τ1)fA−KP }, then it suffices to show that there is no
more than one equilibrium offer S1 ∈ [0, τ2A+KD].45
45No more than one equilibrium offer S1 ∈ [0, τ2A+KD] implies that the grossly negligent defendant randomizes
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We consider 3 steps. First, we show that there is no equilibrium offer in this interval which is
proposed by the grossly negligent defendant only. Second, we show that there is no equilibrium
offer in the interval proposed by the no-grossly-negligent defendant only. Finally, we show that
there is no two distinct equilibrium proposals proposed by both types of defendant.
Part 1.2.1.
If such an equilibrium offer S̃ existed, the plaintiff would reject it with probability 1. Hence
the case would be resolved at trial, and the grossly negligent defendant would lose A+KD. He is
better off offering (1− τ1)fA−KP which is accepted with certainty.
Part 1.2.2.
If such an equilibrium offer S̃ existed, then the plaintiff would accept it with probability 1.
Hence the grossly negligent defendant would be better off, switching to this offer.
Part 1.2.3.
We prove it by contradiction. Assume that there exist two such offers, S1 and S2, such that
0 ≤ S1 < S2 ≤ τ2A+KD. Denote by p1 and p2 the respective equilibrium probabilities of acceptance
of these proposals by the plaintiff. Each type of defendant is indifferent between these proposals.
Hence
S1p1 + (1− p1)(τ2A+KD) = S2p2 + (1− p2)(τ2A+KD) (A1)
and
S1p1 + (1− p1)[(1 − τ1)A+KD] = S2p2 + (1− p2)[(1− τ1)A+KD]. (A2)
Subtracting the first equation from the second one, we get
(1− p1)(1 − τ1 − τ2)A = (1− p2)(1− τ1 − τ2)A. (A3)
Hence, p1 = p2.46 But in that case defendants of both types are strictly better off offering S1.
Contradiction follows.
at most between 2 possible strategies, one of which is (1 − τ1)fA − KP .
46The inequality τ1 + τ2 < 1 holds by assumption (1).
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Part 1.3. We show that under conditions (1)–(3), there are infinitely many partially separating
equilibria (one of them is the one stated in Proposition 1) and infinitely many pooling equilibria.47
Part 1.3.1. Existence of Partially Separating Equilibria of the Pre-Trial Bargaining Subgame
The description of the partially separating equilibria is as follows. If conditions (1)–(3) hold:
1) no-grossly-negligent defendants offer S1 such that 0 ≤ S1 ≤ τ2A + KD, and grossly negligent
defendants mix the two strategies, offer S1 with probability β̃ and offer S2 = (1− τ1)fA−KP with
probability (1− β̃); 2) plaintiffs always file a lawsuit; plaintiffs always accept S248 and mix between
rejection (with probability α̃) and acceptance (with probability (1 − α̃) when the offer is S1 such
that 0 < S1 ≤ τ2A+KD.49
Consider the expected payoffs for the plaintiff, no-grossly-negligent and grossly negligent defen-
dants, in terms of α̃ and β̃. The expected payoff for the plaintiff VP is
VP = (1−q)[α̃(τ2fA−KP )+(1−α̃)(S1)]+q{β̃[α̃[(1−τ1)fA−KP ]+(1−α̃)(S1)]+(1−β̃)[(1−τ1)fA−KP ]}.
(A4)
The expected payoff for the no-grossly-negligent defendant VD1 is
VD1 = α̃(−τ2A−KD) + (1− α̃)(S1). (A5)
And, the expected payoff for the grossly negligent defendant, VD0 is
VD0 = β̃[α̃(−((1− τ1)A+KD)) + (1− α̃)(S1)] + (1− β̃)[−((1 − τ1)fA−KP )]. (A6)
The values of α̃ and β̃ are calculated from the condition that both parties (the plaintiff and the
grossly negligent defendant) have to be indifferent between their strategies to mix them. So,
(1− τ1)fA−KP = α̃((1− τ1)A+KD) + (1− α̃)S1 (A7)
47Condition 0 < [q(1 − τ1) + (1 − q)τ2]fA − KP < KF rules out the equilibrium where no lawsuit is filed; and,
condition (1− τ1)fA − KP > τ2A+KD rules out the pooling equilibrium where the no-grossly-negligent defendant
behaves as a grossly negligent defendant by making a positive settlement offer.
A separating equilibrium is not possible in this game. Suppose that a separating equilibrium exists: no-grossly-
negligent defendants offer S1 ≤ τ2A +KD and grossly negligent defendants offer S2 = S1. Given that S1 is always
accepted by the plaintiff and S2 is always rejected by the plaintiff, then the grossly negligent defendant has an
incentive to deviate to S1 because S1 < (1− τ1)A+KD.
48A defendant offering S2 reveals his type, and hence S2 should be equal to (1− τ1)fA−KP to be always accepted.
49As the plaintiff accepts some of the offers of S1, a grossly negligent defendant has an incentive to mimic the





qβ̃ + (1− q)((1− τ1)fA−KP ) +
1− q
qβ̃ + (1− q)(τ2fA−KP ). (A8)
Equation (A4) says that a grossly negligent defendant is indifferent between admitting his
negligence (i.e., offering S2 = (1 − τ1)fA − KP ) and stating that he is no-grossly-negligent (i.e.,
offering S1) with the risk to lose (1− τ1)A+KD if the case goes to court. Equation (A5) says that
a plaintiff is indifferent between dropping the case and getting a payoff of S1 and going to court.




Then, the expected payoffs for the plaintiff, grossly negligent, and no-grossly-negligent defendant







The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiff believes with proba-
bility (1 − q) that she is confronting a no-grossly-negligent defendant, and with probability q that
she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant. When the plaintiff receives an offer, she updates
her beliefs using Bayes’ rule: when she receives an offer S1, she believes with probability
(1−q)
qβ̃+(1−q)
that she is confronting a no-grossly-negligent defendant and with probability qβ̃
qβ̃+(1−q) that she is
confronting a grossly negligent defendant; when the plaintiff receives an offer S2, she believes with
certainty that she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant.
The off-equilibrium beliefs are as follows. When the plaintiff observes an offer S
′
< S1 or an
offer S1 < S
′
< (1− τ1)fA−KP , she believes that she faces a grossly negligent defendant. Then,
the plaintiff rejects the offer with certainty because she will obtain a higher payoff ((1−τ1)fA−KP )
if she brings the grossly negligent defendant to trial. Given that S
′
is rejected with certainty, the
no-grossly-negligent defendant will not make the offer S
′
because he will receive a higher payoff by
offering S1, which is accepted with positive probability in the proposed equilibrium. Given that
the plaintiff will reject the offer S
′
with certainty, the grossly negligent defendant will not make an
offer S
′
because he will receive a higher payoff by offering S2 = (1 − τ1)fA−KP with probability
50Note that α̃(S1 = 0) = α and β̃(S1 = 0) = β, i.e., the equilibrium path just described corresponds to the partially
separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium stated in Proposition 1.
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(1− β̃) and S1 with probability β̃ (as stated in the proposed equilibrium).
Part 1.3.2. Existence of Pooling Equilibria of the Pre-Trial Bargaining Subgame
The description of the pooling equilibria is as follows. If [q(1− τ1)+ (1− q)τ2]fA−KP > 0 and
(1 − τ1)fA −KP > τ2A +KD: 1) grossly negligent and no-grossly-negligent defendants offer the
same amount S, where 0 < S ≤ τ2A +KD and S ≥ [q(1 − τ1) + (1 − q)τ2]fA −KP ; 2) plaintiffs
always file a lawsuit; plaintiffs always accept the offer S.51
The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiff believes with proba-
bility (1 − q) that she is confronting a no-grossly-negligent defendant, and with probability q that
she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant. Given that defendants pool, when the plaintiff
receives an offer, she cannot update her beliefs. Then, the plaintiff accepts if the offer is greater
than or equal to her ex-ante expected return from trial (S ≥ [q(1 − τ1) + (1 − q)τ2]fA − KP ).52
The off-equilibrium beliefs compatible with this equilibrium are as follows. If the defendant offers
S̃ 	= S, then the plaintiff believes with certainty that he faces the grossly negligent defendant and
rejects the offer.
Part 2. Uniqueness of the Pre-Trial Bargaining Subgame Equilibrium
We prove that the PBE stated in Proposition 1 is the only PBE that survives the universal
divinity refinement is the partially separating PBE, and therefore, this is the unique equilibrium
of the litigation stage. We proceed first to apply the universal divinity refinement to the partially
separating equilibria, and second, to the pooling equilibria. The implementation of the universal
divinity refinement proceeds as follows. First, we find (for no-grossly-negligent and grossly negligent
defendants) the minimum probability of acceptance (by the plaintiff) of an offer that differs from
51if S ≤ τ2A+KD fails to hold, the no-grossly-negligent defendant will find it optimal to deviate, to offer 0, and
go to trial; if S ≥ [q(1− τ1)+ (1− q)τ2]fA−KP fails to hold, the plaintiff will find it profitable to deviate and reject
the proposal S.
Note also that there is no possible pooling with S = 0 and plaintiff accepting the offer with certainty: if every
defendant offers S = 0, then the plaintiff will be better off by rejecting the offer because [q(1−τ1)+(1−q)τ2]fA−KP >
0, i.e., her ex-ante expected payoff from going to trial is greater than the offer. Then, it would be optimal for the
grossly negligent defendant to deviate from offering S = 0 to S
′
= (1− τ1)fA−KP < (1− τ1)A+KD (loss at trial).
52The plaintiff computes the ex-ante return from trial by using her prior beliefs and the payoffs at trial from
confronting grossly negligent and no-grossly-negligent defendants. So, the ex-ante return from trial q[(1 − τ1)fA −
KP ) + (1− q)(τ2fA − KP ) = [q(1− τ1) + (1− q)τ2]fA − KP .
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the equilibrium offers (deviation offer), such that the defendant is willing to deviate. Second, we
compare these minimum probabilities. The defendant with the lower minimum probability will be
the one the plaintiff should expect (with probability one) to deviate.
Part 2.1. Elimination of the Other Partially Separating Equilibria
Consider the deviation S
′
from an equilibrium offer S1 or S2. We will cover the analysis of three
cases: 0 ≤ S′ < τ2A+KD, S′ = τ2A+KD and τ2A+KD < S′ < fA−KP .
Case I: 0 ≤ S′ < τ2A+KD
For mathematical convenience, define S
′
= S1 − ε. If ε < 0, then the deviation offer S′ > S1;
and, if ε > 0, then the deviation offer S
′
< S1.
Proceed first to analyze the case of the grossly negligent defendant. The grossly negligent
defendant will be willing to deviate if
pN (S1 − ε) + (1− pN)((1 − τ1)A+KD) ≤ [(1− τ1)fA−KP ], (A9)
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the grossly negligent
defendant from deviating and the right-hand side represents his expected loss in equilibrium.53
Solving for pN we get
pN ≥ (1− τ1)(1− f)A+KP +KD(1− τ1)A+KD − S1 + ε . (A10)
Then, the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation offer made by the grossly negligent
defendant is
pN =
(1− τ1)(1− f)A+KP +KD
(1− τ1)A+KD − S1 + ε . (A11)
Now find the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation by the plaintiff, such that the
no-grossly-negligent defendant is still willing to propose it.
pC(S1 − ε) + (1− pC)(τ2A+KD ≤
53Note that in every partially separating PBE of the litigation game (under the conditions qfA − KP > 0 and




S1(1− (1− τ1)fA−KP − S1(1− τ1)A+KD − S1 ) + (τ2A+KD)
(1 − τ1)fA−KP − S1
(1− τ1)A+KD − S1
]
, (A12)
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the no-grossly-negligent
defendant from deviating and the right-hand side represents his expected loss in equilibrium.54
Solving for pC we get
pC ≥ τ2A+KD
τ2A+KD − S1 + ε−
− [(1− τ1)(1− f)A+KP +KD]S1 + [(1− τ1)fA−KP − S1](τ2A+KD)
[(1− τ1)A+KD − S1](τ2A+KD − S1 + ε) (A13)




τ2A+KD − S1 + ε−
− [(1− τ1)(1− f)A+KP +KD]S1 + [(1− τ1)fA−KP − S1](τ2A+KD)
[(1− τ1)A+KD − S1](τ2A+KD − S1 + ε) (A14)
Compare the threshold probabilities for the grossly negligent and no-grossly-negligent defendant.
pC − pN = τ2A+KD
τ2A+KD − S1 + ε−
− [(1− τ1)(1− f)A+KP +KD]S1 + [(1− τ1)fA−KP − S1](τ2A+KD)
[(1− τ1)A+KD − S1](τ2A+KD − S1 + ε) −
−(1− τ1)(1− f)A+KP +KD
(1− τ1)A+KD − S1 + ε =
=
−A(1− τ1 − τ2)ε[(1 − τ1)(1− f)A+KD +KP ]
((1− τ1)A+KD − S1)(τ2A+KD − S1 + ε)((1 − τ1)A+KD − S1 + ε) , (A15)
where the expressions in bracket and parentheses are positive. Then, if ε < 0, pN < pC ; and, if
ε > 0, pN > pC .
Following the universal divinity refinement, if 0 ≤ S′ < τ2A + KD and ε < 0 (S′ > S1),
the plaintiff should believe that the deviation S
′
comes from a grossly negligent defendant with
54Remember that α̃(S1 = 0) = α. Given that we need to apply the results of this proof to check all partially
separating PBE of the litigation game, we will use α̃ in the computation of the expected payoff for the no-grossly-
negligent defendant. Note that in every partially separating PBE of the litigation game (under the conditions
qfA − KP > 0 and fA − KP > KD) the expected payoff for the no-grossly-negligent defendant does depend on S1.
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probability one. On the other hand, if ε > 0 (S
′
< S1), the plaintiff should believe with probability
one that the deviation S
′
comes from a no-grossly-negligent defendant.
Apply the universal divinity refinement to the other partially separating equilibria (where 0 <
S1 ≤ KD). The off-equilibrium beliefs imply that the plaintiff should infer that any deviation S′
comes from a grossly negligent defendant. In case of ε > 0 (S
′
< S1), these off-equilibrium beliefs do
not survive the refinement. The plaintiff should believe that the deviation comes from a no-grossly-
negligent defendant and accept the offer. This response from the plaintiff will generate an incentive
for the grossly negligent defendant to deviate and offer S1−ε. Hence, the other partially separating
equilibria (where 0 < S1 ≤ KD) do not pass the test of universal divinity for 0 ≤ S′ < τ2A+KD.
We will apply now the universal divinity refinement to the empirically relevant equilibrium
(where S1 = 0). The off-equilibrium beliefs imply that the plaintiff should infer that any deviation
comes from a grossly negligent defendant. Note also that given that S1 = 0 is the lowest possible
offer, only deviations above S1 (i.e., S
′
> S1) are possible. Therefore, the off-equilibrium beliefs
survive the universal divinity refinement. Hence, the empirically relevant equilibrium passes the




The minimum probability of acceptance of a deviation offer made by the grossly negligent
defendant is still given by equation (A8).
For the case of the no-grossly-negligent defendant, note that his expected deviation loss is
τ2A+KD and his expected equilibrium loss is in the interval (
(1−τ1)fA−KP
(1−τ1)A+KD (τ2A+KD), τ2A+KD)
(for 0 < S1 < τ2A + KD) and is equal to
(1−τ1)fA−KP
(1−τ1)A+KD < τ2A + KD (for S1 = 0). Then, for any




By universal divinity, the plaintiff should expect that any deviation offer S
′
= τ2A+KD comes





Given that the partially separating PBE stated in Proposition 1 is the only partially separating
equilibrium that survives the universal divinity refinement in both cases, then the equilibrium
proposed in Proposition 1 is the only universal divine partially separating PBE.
Part 2.2. Elimination of the Pooling Equilibria
Consider the deviation S
′
from an equilibrium offer S. We will cover the analysis of two cases:
0 ≤ S′ < τ2A+KD and S′ = τ2A+KD.
Case I: 0 ≤ S′ < τ2A+KD
For mathematical convenience, define S
′
= S− ε. If ε < 0, then the deviation offer S′ > S; and,
if ε > 0, then the deviation offer S
′
< S.
Proceed first to analyze the case of the grossly negligent defendant. The grossly negligent
defendant will be willing to deviate if
pN (S − ε) + (1− pN )[(1− τ1)A+KD) ≤ S, (A16)
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the grossly negligent
defendant from deviating and the right-hand side represents his expected loss in equilibrium.55
Solving for pN we get
pN ≥ (1− τ1)A+KD − S(1− τ1)A+KD − S + ε . (A17)
Then, the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation offer made by the grossly negligent
defendant is
pN =
(1− τ1)A+KD − S
(1− τ1)A+KD − S + ε . (A18)
Now find the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation by the plaintiff, such that the
no-grossly-negligent defendant is still willing to propose it.
pC(S − ε) + (1− pC)(τ2A+KD) ≤ S, (A19)
55Note that in every pooling PBE of the litigation game (under the conditions qfA−KP > 0 and fA−KP > KD)
the expected payoff for the grossly negligent defendant is S.
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where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the no-grossly-negligent
defendant from deviating and the right-hand side represents his expected loss in equilibrium. Solv-
ing for pC we get
pC ≥ τ2A+KD − S
τ2A+KD − S + ε . (A20)




τ2A+KD − S + ε . (A21)
Note that inspection of equations (A21) and (A18) show that if ε < 0, the left-hand side of the
inequalities will be greater than 1. Given that the right-hand side of the inequalities correspond
to probabilities (which cannot be greater than 1), the inspection of these equations permits us to
conclude that the universal divinity refinement is not applicable for cases where ε < 0. Then, we
will proceed to the application of the universal divinity refinement only in cases where ε > 0.
Compare the threshold probabilities for the grossly negligent and no-grossly-negligent defendant.
pC − pN = −Aε(1− τ1 − τ2)(τ2A+KD − S + ε)((1− τ1)A+KD − S + ε) , (A22)
where A and the expressions in parentheses are positive. Then, if ε > 0, pN > pC .
Following the universally divinity refinement, if 0 ≤ S′ < τ2A +KD and ε > 0 (S′ < S), the
plaintiff should believe with probability one that the deviation S
′
comes from a no-grossly-negligent
defendant.
Apply the universal divinity refinement to the pooling equilibria (where 0 < S ≤ τ2 + KD).
The off-equilibrium beliefs imply that the plaintiff should infer that any deviation S
′
comes from
a grossly negligent defendant. These off-equilibrium beliefs do not survive the refinement. The
plaintiff should believe that the deviation comes from a no-grossly-negligent defendant and accept
the offer. This response from the plaintiff will generate an incentive for the grossly negligent
defendant to deviate and offer S − ε. Hence, the pooling equilibria (where 0 < S ≤ τ2A+KD) do





The minimum probability of acceptance of a deviation offer made by the grossly negligent
defendant is still given by equation (A11).
For the case of the no-grossly-negligent defendant, note that his expected deviation loss is KD
and his expected equilibrium loss is in the interval (fA−KPA+KD ,KD) (for 0 < S < KD) and is equal
to fA−KPA+KD < KD (for S = 0). Then, for any probability of acceptance, the no-grossly-negligent
defendant will not be willing to deviate when S
′
= KD.
By universal divinity, the plaintiff should expect that any deviation offer S
′
= KD comes




Given that no pooling PBE survive the universal divinity refinement in both cases, there is no
universal divine pooling PBE.
Hence, the partially separating PBE stated in Proposition 1 is the unique universally divine
PBE of the litigation stage. Q.E.D.
Part 3. Existence and Uniqueness of the Game Equilibrium
In the third part, we prove that some but not all potential plaintiffs file a lawsuit, that some but
not all potential injurers are grossly negligent, and that the described mixed-strategy equilibrium
is the only equilibrium of the game.
Part 3.1. Some But Not All Potential Plaintiffs File A Lawsuit
We prove that 0 < m < 1. The proof has two parts.
Part 3.1.1. m > 0





] , it suffices to show that [λ0 − λ1 (τ2A+KD)(1−τ1)A+KD
]
>
0. By assumption, λ0 > λ1; and by condition (1), τ2A+KD < (1−τ1)fA−KP . Then, τ2A+KD <
(1− τ1)fA−KP < (1− τ1)A+KD. Hence, τ2A+KD(1−τ1)A+KD < 1. Q.E.D.
Part 3.1.2. m < 1
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, where A1 = fA2λ0,







First, we show that m is increasing in τ1 and τ2. Next, we compute τ̄1 and τ̄2.
Part 3.1.2.1.






λ0 − λ1 (τ2A+KD)(1−τ1)A+KD
]2 [−fA
(




+[(1− τ1)fA−KP ] (τ2A+KD)[(1− τ1)A+KD]2 (−A)] > 0. (A23)













Hence, an increase in τ1 or τ2 raise filing.
Part 3.1.2.2.
1) Computation of τ̄1.
The maximum feasible range of τ1 consistent with m < 1 is attained if τ2 = 0. Given that m is
increasing in τ1,m < 1 if and only if τ1 < τ̄1, where τ̄1 is defined implicitly bym(τ1 = τ̄1, τ2 = 0) = 1.




λ0 − λ1 KD(1−τ̄1)A+KD
] = 1 (A25)
After some straightforward algebraic manipulations the last equation becomes:
A1(1− τ̄1)2 +B1(1− τ̄1)− C1 = 0, (A26)
where A1 ≡ fA2λ0 > 0, B1 ≡ fAλ0KD − AKPλ1 − CA− λ1fAKD, and C1 ≡ (λ0 − λ1)KPKD +
cKD > 0.
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Equation (A26) is a quadratic equation in 1 − τ1. It has two roots, 1 − τ11 and 1 − τ21 , such
that (1 − τ11 )(1 − τ21 ) = −C1A1 < 0. Hence, one root is negative, and the other one is positive. The
negative value of 1− τ1 means that τ1 > 1, which is impossible. Hence, to calculate τ̄1, we need to














2) Computation of τ̄2.
Given that m is increasing in τ2 for any given τ1, m < 1 if and only if τ2 < τ̄2(τ1), where τ̄2(τ1)
is defined implicitly by m(τ1, τ2 = τ̄2(τ1)) = 1.




λ0 − λ1 τ̄2A+KD(1−τ1)A+KD
] = 1. (A29)












Part 3.2. Some But Not All Potential Injurers Are Grossly Negligent
We prove that 0 < q < 1
By condition (3), KP > τ2fA. Then, 0 < q. In addition, condition (2) implies that q < 1.
Q.E.D.
Part 3.3. Uniqueness of the Game Equilibrium
We prove that the described mixed-strategy equilibrium is the only equilibrium of the game.
Suppose that the probability of being no-grossly-negligent is greater than the one set by equation
(15) (it can be equal to one), i.e. p̃ > p. This will imply a lower conditional (on the occurrence
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of the accident) probability that the defendant is grossly negligent, q̃ < q, determined by equation
(14). Given that the expected payoff of the plaintiff, [q(1−τ1)+(1−q)τ2]fA−KP depends positively
on q, it will be lower as well. Hence, the probability of filing m will be also lower. But in that
case, the left-hand side of equation (10) will be greater than the right-hand side. Therefore, it will
be optimal for all prospective defendants not to take care, which contradicts the initial assumption
that p̃ > p. The impossibility of the opposite case, p̃ < p can be shown similarly. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2.






λ0 − λ1 (τ2A+KD)(1−τ1)A+KD
]2 [−fA
(




+[(1− τ1)fA−KP ] (τ2A+KD)[(1− τ1)A+KD]2 (−A)] > 0. (A31)
Hence, an increase in τ1 raises filing.




(F−1(m))′ ∂m∂τ1 fA(1− τ1 − τ2) + fA(F−1(m) +KP − τ2fA)
[fA(1− τ1 − τ2]2 > 0, (A32)
because τ1 + τ2 < 1.




− ∂q∂τ1 [λ0(1− q) + λ1q]− (1− q)
[




[λ0(1− q) + λ1q]2 =
−λ0λ1 ∂q∂τ1
[λ0(1− q) + λ1q]2 < 0. (A33)
In words, an increase in the level of court error τ1 reduces the probability that the potential
defendant chooses to be no-grossly-negligent, and hence, reduces the general level of care, and
increases the unconditional probability of an accident, µ = λ0 + p(λ1 − λ0).
Given that ∂q∂τ1 > 0, then, the effect of τ1 on the conditional probability of trial can be obtained
as follows.
Differentiating the conditional probability of trial, equation (8), with respect to τ1 yields
fA




− ∂q∂τ1 (1− τ1 − τ2)[(1− τ1)A+KD]−A(1− q)τ2 − (1− q)KD
}
[(1− τ1)A+KD]2 < 0. (A34)
Hence an increase in τ1 reduces the conditional probability of trial. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3.














Proof of Proposition 4.
The proof proceeds in two parts. First, we show the effects of the introduction of damage caps,
and second we prove the effects of the introduction of split-awards.
Part 1.















+[(1− τ1)fA−KP ]λ1 (1− τ1 − τ2)KD[(1− τ1)A+KD]2 } < 0. (A36)
Therefore, a reduction in A increases the probability of filing.





(F−1(m))′ ∂m∂A − τ2f
]
fA(1− τ1 − τ2)− f(1− τ1 − τ2)[F−1(m) +KP − τ2fA]
[fA(1− τ1 − τ2]2 < 0. (A37)
The last inequality holds because ∂m∂A < 0 and F
−1(m) +KP − τ2fA > 0.
Given that ∂q∂A < 0, then, the effect ofA on the conditional probability of trial and the probability
that a defendant chooses to be no-grossly-negligent can be obtained as follows.
Differentiating the conditional probability of trial, equation (8), with respect to A yields
f(1− q)(1− τ1 − τ2)KD + [(1− τ1)A+KD]
[
−fA(1− τ1 − τ2) ∂q∂A
]
[(1− τ1)A+KD]2 > 0. (A38)
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Hence, the introduction of damage caps, i.e., the reduction in A, reduces the conditional prob-
ability of trial.
Differentiating the probability that a defendant chooses to be no-grossly-negligent p, equation




− ∂q∂A [λ0(1− q) + λ1q]− (1− q)(λ1 − λ0) ∂q∂A
[λ0(1− q) + λ1q]2 = −
λ0λ1 ∂q∂A
[λ0(1− q) + λ1q]2 > 0. (A39)
In words, an increase in the expected level of court award reduces the probability that the
potential defendant chooses to be no-grossly-negligent, and hence, reduces the general level of care,
and increases the unconditional probability of an accident, µ = λ0 + p(λ1 − λ0).
Part 2.
Differentiating the probability of filing, equation (16), with respect to f yields
∂m
∂f
= − c(1− τ1)A
[(1− τ1)fA−KP ]2
[
λ0 − λ1 τ2A+KD(1−τ1)A+KD
] < 0. (A40)





(F−1(m))′ ∂m∂f − τ2A
]
fA(1− τ1 − τ2)−A(1− τ1 − τ2)[F−1(m) +KP − τ2fA]
[fA(1− τ1 − τ2)]2 < 0. (A41)
The last inequality holds trivially because (F−1(m))′ > 0 and ∂m∂f < 0.
Given that ∂q∂f < 0, then, the effect of f on the conditional probability of trial and the probability
that a defendant chooses to be no-grossly-negligent can be obtained as follows.
Differentiating the conditional probability of trial, equation (8), with respect to f yields
A(1− q)(1− τ1 − τ2)− fA(1− τ1 − τ2) ∂q∂f
(1− τ1)A+KD > 0. (A42)
Differentiating the probability that a defendant chooses to be no-grossly-negligent p, equation




− ∂q∂f [λ0(1− q) + λ1q]− (1− q)(λ1 − λ0) ∂q∂f
[λ0(1− q) + λ1q]2 = −
λ0λ1 ∂q∂f
[λ0(1− q) + λ1q]2 > 0. (A43)
Q.E.D.
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Solution of the Model of Liability and Litigation under the English Rule
Equilibrium Characterization.
The structure of the equilibrium is similar to the one adopted for the benchmark model. This
equilibrium constitutes the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game that survives Banks
and Sobel’s (1987) universal divinity refinement under the following conditions:
(1− τ1)fA− τ1(KP +KD) > τ2(A+KP +KD), (A44)



















] . ˆ̄τ1 and ˆ̄τ2(τ1) correspond to the values for τ1 and τ2
for which m̂ = 1.56
Proposition A1 characterizes the unique universally divine equilibrium of the game under the
English rule.
Proposition A1. Assume that conditions (A44)–(A46) hold. Then, the following strategy profile,
together with the players’ beliefs, represents the equilibrium path of the unique universally divine
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game under the English rule.
Strategy Profile





] . In response to
an offer Ŝ1 = 0, the plaintiff rejects the offer (goes to trial) with probability α̂ =
(1−τ1)fA−τ1(KP +KD)
(1−τ1)(A+KP +KD)
and accepts the offer (drops the action) with probability (1 − α̂); the plaintiff always accepts the
offer Ŝ2 = (1− τ1)fA− τ1(KP +KD) (settles out-of-court).
56Conditions (A44)–(A46) are equivalent to conditions (1)–(3) in the benchmark model. Under these conditions,
there are other partially separating equilibria and pooling equilibria, which are ruled out by the divinity criterion.
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. The grossly negligent defendant
makes no offer (offers Ŝ1 = 0) with probability β̂ =
[(1−τ2)(KP +KD)−τ2fA)(1−q)
q[(1−τ1)fA−τ1(KP +KD)] and offers Ŝ2 =
(1 − τ1)fA − τ1(KP + KD) with probability (1 − β̂). The no-grossly-negligent defendant always
makes no offer (offers Ŝ1 = 0).
Plaintiff’s Beliefs
The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiff believes with probability
(1 − q̂) that she is confronting a no-grossly-negligent defendant, and with probability q̂ that she
is confronting a grossly negligent defendant. When the plaintiff receives an offer, she updates
her beliefs using Bayes’ rule: when she receives an offer Ŝ1 = 0, she believes with probability
(1−q̂)
q̂β̂+(1−q̂) that she is confronting a no-grossly-negligent defendant and with probability
q̂ β̂
q̂ β̂+(1−q̂)
that she is confronting a grossly negligent defendant; when the plaintiff receives an offer Ŝ2 =
(1 − τ1)fA− τ1(KP +KD), she believes with certainty that she is confronting a grossly negligent
defendant. The off-equilibrium beliefs are as follows. When the plaintiff receives an offer S
′
such
that 0 < S
′
< (1−τ1)fA−τ1(KP+KD) or when she receives an offer S′ > (1−τ1)fA−τ1(KP+KD),
she believes that this offer was made by a grossly negligent defendant.
Proof.
Following the steps described in the proof of Proposition 1, it is easy to show that Proposition
5 holds. Q.E.D.
Equilibrium Solution.
The model is solved backwards. We start by finding the solution of the pre-trial bargaining
subgame. Then, we evaluate the plaintiff’s filing decision and assess the defendant’s choice of care.
Note first that under the English rule, the expected payoff at trial for the no-grossly-negligent
and grossly negligent defendants are −τ2(A+KP +KD) and −(1− τ1)(A+KP +KD), respectively.
The expected payoff at trial of the plaintiff is τ2fA − (1 − τ2)(KP + KD) if the defendant is no-
grossly-negligent, and it is equal to (1− τ1)fA− τ1(KP +KD) if the defendant is grossly negligent.
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The values of α̂ and β̂ are calculated from the condition that both parties (the plaintiff and the
grossly negligent defendant) have to be indifferent between their strategies to mix them.57 Then,
α̂ =
(1− τ1)fA− τ1(KP +KD)
(1− τ1)(A+KP +KD) , (A47)
and
β̂ =
[(1− τ2)(KP +KD)− τ2fA)(1− q)
q[(1− τ1)fA− τ1(KP +KD)] . (A48)
The expected litigation payoffs for the plaintiff and no-grossly-negligent and grossly negligent
defendant are VP = q̂(1− β̂)[(1− τ1)fA− τ1(KP +KD)] = q̂fA(1− τ1 − τ2) + τ2fA− [(1− q̂)(1−
τ2) + q̂τ1](KP +KD), VD1 = − [q̂(1− τ1) + (1− q)τ2)] fA− [q̂τ1 + (1− q̂)(1 − τ2)](KP +KD) and
VD0 = −[(1− τ1)fA− τ1(KP +KD)], respectively.
The conditional probability of trial is given by
α̂[1− q̂(1− β̂)] = (fA+KP +KD)(1 − q)(1− τ1 − τ2)
(1− τ1)(A+KP +KD) . (A49)
Using the previous results on plaintiff’s expected payoff from litigation, we analyze now the
plaintiff’s decision about filing.
A plaintiff will file a lawsuit if her expected payoff from suing (i.e., expected litigation payoff
net of filing costs) is positive, that is if
q̂fA(1− τ1 − τ2) + τ2fA− [(1 − q̂)(1 − τ2) + q̂τ1](KP +KD)−KF > 0. (A50)
Then, the probability of filing is
F ([q̂(1− τ1) + τ2(1− q̂)]fA− [(1− q̂)(1− τ2) + q̂τ1](KP +KD)) ≡ m. (A51)
The defendant is indifferent between taking care and not taking care in equilibrium, and then




1− τ1 (KP +KD)
]
= m̂λ0[(1 − τ1)fA− τ1(KP +KD)]. (A52)
57These conditions are as follows: (1 − τ1)fA − τ1(KP + KD) = α̂[(1 − τ1)(A + KP + KD)] + (1 − α̂)(0), and
0 = q̂β̂
q̂β̂+(1−q̂) [((1− τ1)fA − τ1(KP +KD)] +
1−q̂
q̂β̂+(1−q̂) [(τ2fA(1− τ2)(KP +KD)], for the grossly negligent defendant
and plaintiff, respectively.
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Solving the last equation for m̂, we obtain the probability of filing that supports the random-
ization of the choice of care.
m̂ =
c
[(1− τ1)fA− τ1(KP +KD)]
[
λ0 − λ1 τ21−τ1
] . (A53)
It is important to note, that m > 0 because λ0 > λ1 (by assumption) and because condition
(A44) ensures that τ21−τ1 < 1. In addition, conditions (A45) and (A46) guarantee that m < 1.
Then, using equation (A52), we obtain q̂, the probability that an accident is caused by a grossly
negligent defendant.
q̂ =
F−1(m̂) + (1− τ2)(KP +KD)− τ2fA
(fA+KP +KD)(1 − τ1 − τ2) . (A54)
The expression for q̂ is always positive, because (KP + KD) > τ2(fA + KP + KD) by condition
(A46). In addition, condition (A45) implies that q̂ < 1.

















Using the previous results, we now derive the probability of accident µ = λ1p̂ + λ0(1 − p̂) and
the unconditional probability of trial (fA+KP +KD)λ
1p̂(1−τ1−τ2)
(1−τ1)(A+KP +KD) m̂, where p̂ is given by equation (A55)
and m̂ is given by equation (A53).
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Proof of Proposition 5.
The proof proceeds in three parts. First, we show that under condition (1 − τ1)KP > τ1KD,
(1−τ1)fA−KP < (1−τ1)fA−τ1(KP+KD). Second, we prove that λ0−λ1 τ2A+KD(1−τ1)A+KD < λ0−λ1
τ2
1−τ1 .
Third, we conclude that under the American rule the probability of filing, m is higher than under
the English rule.
Part 1.
By the assumption of Proposition 5,
(1− τ1)fA−KP − [(1− τ1)fA− τ1(KP +KD)] = τ1KD − (1− τ1)KP < 0. (A56)
Part 2.
λ0 − λ1 τ2A+KD
(1− τ1)A+KD − [λ
0 − λ1 τ2









= −λ1 KD(1− τ1 − τ2)
(1− τ1)[(1− τ1)A+KD] < 0. (A57)
Part 3.
In parts 1 and 2, we show that both terms in the denominator of the expression for m under
the American rule are smaller than corresponding terms under the English rule. Hence, m, is lower
under the English rule. Q.E.D.
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(1− τ1)(A+KP +KD)fA . (A58)
The proof proceeds in three parts. First, we show that the second term of equation (A58),
(fA+KP +KD)[(1−τ1)A+KD)




Finally, we show that under the condition τ2 > KDKP +KD , the term
1−q̂
1−q is greater than unity and
p̂ > p, i.e., the level of care is higher under the English rule.
Part 1.
The term (fA+KP +KD)[(1−τ1)A+KD)(1−τ1)(A+KP +KD)fA can be rewritten as





fA2 + fAKP + fAKD
> 1, (A59)
because AKP > fAKP and AKD > fAKD.
Part 2.
q̂ < q if and only if
F−1(m̂) + (KP +KD)(1− τ2)− fAτ2
fA+KP +KD
<
F−1(m) +K + P − τ2fA
fA
. (A60)
Given that fA +KP + KD > fA and m̂ < m (filing is lower under the English rule), (KP +
KD)(1 − τ2) < KP is a sufficient condition for q̂ < q to hold. It is straightforward to show that
(KP +KD)(1− τ2) < KP is equivalent to τ2 > KDKP +KD .
Part 3.
1−q̂
1−q > 1 if and only if q̂ < q. Hence,
1−q̂
1−q > 1 holds if τ2 >
KD
KP +KD






> 1. Furthermore, q̂ < q implies p̂ > p. In words, a switch to the English rule
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FIGURE 1
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THE GAME
D chooses level of care e
Accident does
not occur Game ends
Accident occurs
Nature decides P ’s type
P decides whether to file a lawsuit
P files KF
P does not file Game ends
D makes an offer S
P rejects KP , KD
P accepts Game ends
Trial
No award
e0 [Prob. τ1]; e1 [Prob. (1− τ2)] Game ends
Court awards A
e0 [Prob. (1− τ1)]; e1 [Prob. τ2]
Game ends
Note: D = defendant; P = plaintiff; KF = plaintiff’s opportunity cost of time;
KD = defendant’s litigation costs; KP = plaintiff’s litigation costs;
A = punitive damage award; e0, e1 = levels of care; τ1, τ2 = court’s errors.
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